Together We Stand

[ 35 ] to preventing violent conflict. The 2015 OECD Fragile States report found that only nine per cent of official development assistance globally is dedicated to justice, security and politi- cal development, the cornerstones of conflict prevention. Moreover, when we ignore violent tendencies during a humanitarian crisis, we can contribute to worsening cycles of violence and fragility that keep countries like South Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan mired in poverty. The truth is, if we want to address the root causes of humanitarian emergencies, we must first address the role of violence. The stakes are high: addressing conflict right can mean earlier transitions to recovery, new community-led compacts for reconciliation and inclusion, greater prospects for food security and, hopefully, lasting peace. Failing to address it can lead to more Democratic Republic of Congos and South Sudans — costly, multi-decade humanitarian responses that perpetuate aid dependency, leave communi- ties less resilient, and reinforce systemic corruption. Research from Mercy Corps’ experience in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the greater Horn of Africa affirms that reducing conflict head-on can lay the foundation for more swiftly mitigating humanitarian needs and a better chance of sustainable development gains. Case study: DRC In the DRC, a qualitative research initiative led by Mercy Corps, Search for Common Ground, World Vision and La Fund Social found that after 20 years of a humanitarian response in North Kivu, communities were less capable of adapting to the shocks and stresses of their current status than they were before the humanitarian response. In eastern DRC, humanitarian aid has permeated the country on a massive scale since 1994 — yet needs are greater than ever. We wanted to know why years of persistent aid had not improved basic development indicators and quality of life. Our research revealed an unabated economic market of violence — a cycle of suffering perpetuated by a void of legiti- mate ways to make a living, particularly among young people. Because the humanitarian strategies developed in the mid to late 1990s focused only on short-term, direct delivery approaches to address displaced persons’ most urgent needs, activities focused on reducing conflict were never prioritized. As the crisis evolved and hit transitional benchmarks into becoming a ‘protracted’ emergency, neither the relief commu- nity nor the development community decisively adjusted their priorities to address the drivers, or consequences, of violence. This strategic oversight contributed, in part, to the reality humanitarian and development actors face today: a context in which displaced and host communities resent one another, perception of the humanitarian response is poor, and youth are more compelled to engage in the illicit market of violence than the formal economy. Within this market of violence, burglary, robbery and extortion appear as better options to youth, perceived as more legitimate ways for people in the commu- nity to earn status, purpose, and income. Becoming a violent entrepreneur in eastern DRC is not extreme, but rational based on the incentive system. Twenty years after the beginning of the humanitarian response, youth are now caught in a vicious circle of violence that is extremely difficult to break. Image: Sean Sheridan Mercy Corps’ programme in the Central African Republic helped Muslim and Christian communities to work together to rebuild community cohesion T ogether W e S tand