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T
ransboundary
W
ater
M
anagement
may be the case, it is clear that such an assertion should
not be overextended.
19
Phillips and others point out
that the level of securitisation in a river basin is an
impediment to a functionalist (cooperation leading to
cooperation) approach since the preoccupation of the
states will be on national security, thereby clearly limit-
ing the room for regional perspectives.
20
This is clearly
evident in places like the Jordan Basin,
21
but also in
other regions with a strong security focus. This does not
mean that cooperation cannot happen, but the asser-
tion that this would almost automatically lead to wider
cooperation is far-fetched.
The challenges faced by the international commu-
nity are daunting. However, development partners
can contribute to overcoming these challenges by
supporting the processes of cooperation that underpin
systems of best or ideal practice in transboundary water
management. Staying for the long haul is essential to
the achievement of sustainable and effective cooperative
outcomes. Öjendal and others
22
conclude that, given
the challenges at hand – compounded by the uncer-
tainties surrounding climate change and increased
population growth – it is more relevant than ever to
discuss transboundary water relations as a matter of
continuous negotiation.
The Jordan River along the Jordan-Israel northern border: there are some encouraging signs of cooperation over shared waters in the Middle East
Image: Rami Abdelrahman, SIWI 2013
still exist deep cleavages between neighbouring nations. However,
there are some encouraging signs of cooperation over shared
waters. There are, in fact, situations where water seems to be
the singular bond between countries that have been historically
prone to conflict. For example, the Jordan Basin features a peace
agreement between Israel and Jordan that regulates water alloca-
tions stemming from the Jordan River to quite a large extent and
even includes a provision for storing of Jordanian ‘winter water’
in Lake Tiberias in Israel for later release during the dry summer
months when the water is needed. Since the signing of the agree-
ment in 1994, there has been a functional relationship – albeit
not always smooth – made possible by the parties’ arrangement to
share water. Alternatively, the distinct power asymmetry between
Israel and Palestine has prevented a similar arrangement between
those two countries. Since Palestine does not have the same politi-
cal clout regionally or internationally as Jordan, it is all too easy
for Israel to dominate the water situation. Consequently, there is
no fully-fledged agreement between them addressing water issues,
either quantitatively or qualitatively, in great detail. Although it
is noted in current agreements that the Palestinians have ‘water
rights’– those rights are not clearly defined.
18
Conclusions
It has been suggested that regional cooperation over water as a
shared resource can be a recipe for wider cooperation. While this