Free Flow

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Transboundary water diplomacy

in the Mekong region

Dr John Dore, Senior Regional Water Resources Sector Specialist, Australian Agency for International Development,

Laos; and Dr Louis Lebel, Director, Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Chiang Mai University, Thailand

ater resources lie at the heart of development in

the Mekong region – the territory, ecosystems,

people, economies and politics of Cambodia, Laos,

Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and China’s Yunnan Province

are home to about 260 million people. Future quality of life

in the region is strongly linked to the choices made about

sharing, developing and managing water to produce food

and energy, maintain vital ecosystems and sustain liveli-

hoods. Many water resource projects have been completed,

are underway or are being planned. Dams, river diversions,

inter-basin transfers, thirsty cities and irrigation expansion

are all in the mix. While some projects have been celebrated,

others are subject to disputes and protests. The transbound-

ary and interconnected nature of the Mekong’s waters adds

a critical dimension.

There are many rivers in the Mekong region, but the iconic Mekong

River is at the centre of current debates about water resource devel-

opment in the wider region. It is the longest river in South-East Asia

and the eighth largest by flow volume in the world.

Leaders of Mekong countries are aware that their countries’ desti-

nies are entwined. Those destinies will be partly shaped by the

extension of increased cooperation into the realm of water resources

development on the Mekong River and other transboundary rivers

such as the Irrawaddy, Salween and Red. The Mekong region’s water-

scapes are being contested, demonstrating a confrontation of interests

and world views that are hard to reconcile despite a fresh rhetoric

of trade-offs, benefit sharing and win-win solutions. Dams that are

‘powering progress’ and publicly justified by reference to develop-

ment aspirations and poverty alleviation might well, simultaneously,

jeopardize food security and the livelihoods of the poorest.

There is additional uncertainty from external forces that shape

the future of the region. For example, climate change is expected

to affect river flows and agricultural potential. Global economic

growth and contraction will also influence the final outcome of

many Mekong-made decisions. Dealing with uncertainty is the fate

of most decision makers, not only those taking water resources deci-

sions. Yet, because of the way it interconnects people’s livelihoods

and ecosystems, the complexity of water has particular importance.

The interests of investors, officials in government agencies and

small, local users of water such as fishers and farmers or distant

city dwellers needing energy, are visible – or not – depending

on how Mekong arenas are configured and controlled. There are

very different ways of valuing and prioritizing uses and users. Some

privilege flood protection and energy production services, others the

meeting of farmer needs in the dry season and secur-

ing valuable fisheries. Governments at various levels are

the main transboundary water governance actors in the

Mekong region. But, as elsewhere, there is a plethora of

others jostling for space in decision-making arenas: non-

government organizations, media, business, financiers,

policy research institutes, universities and networks.

Among these are the Mekong River Commission (MRC),

M-POWER network and Save the Mekong coalition.

MRC has a contested mandate – embodied in the

1995

Mekong River Agreement

– for the mainstream, tributar-

ies and lands of the basin within the territories of the four

lower Mekong countries – Laos, Thailand, Cambodia

and Viet Nam. It also now includes the two upper coun-

tries – China and Myanmar – in some of its activities

and outreach. Development partners and other cooperat-

ing institutions also play a role in the MRC. This Mekong

cooperation was originally catalysed through the United

Nations and has more than 50 years of history. Article 1

of the Agreement commits the four member countries to

cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utiliza-

tion, management and conservation of the Mekong River

Basin in fields such as irrigation, hydropower, navigation,

flood control and fisheries.

MRC is led by a governing Council at ministerial level

which meets once per year, and a Joint Committee (JC) of

senior government officials which meets formally twice

per year and informally as the need arises. The Council

and JC are serviced by the MRC Secretariat (MRCS),

which is responsible for implementing council and JC

decisions, advising and providing technical and admin-

istrative support. Although not specifically mentioned

in the agreement, there are also National Mekong

Committees (NMCs) established in each member

country, set up differently in each country depending

on national government preferences. The heads of the

NMCs represent their countries on the JC. NMCs are

serviced by NMC Secretariats (NMCSs) and should

provide access to MRC issues by a range of line agencies.

There is a political dynamic between each of these

five parts – that is, there is no homogeneous single

MRC. Any joint position needs to be collectively negoti-

ated between the council and JC members. Moreover,

the MRCS must also manage its working relationships

with the NMCSs, which are quick to object if they feel

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iplomacy