Previous Page  29 / 156 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 29 / 156 Next Page
Page Background

Firstly, only very few allies, such as the US, are capable of trans-

porting significant relief capabilities rapidly over great distances

to stricken areas and to sustain the effort. Secondly, NATO’s

primary contribution is the coordinating, liaising and facilitating

function that the EADRCC and the alliance’s military structures

provide. These enable smaller allies to contribute capabilities,

such as a military hospital or water purification unit, that they

would not be able to contribute on their own. In addition, this

coordination role that characterizes NATO-led operations has

proven useful both to the authorities of the receiving country and

to the UN, which was thereby able to deal with a single actor

rather than many.

Can NATO take a decision on disaster relief almost as quickly

as a national government? In general, when there is a precedent,

the alliance is able to move rapidly. The decision to set up an air-

bridge to Pakistan, for example, could be taken quickly, above

all, because there was already a precedent, namely the airlift to the

US in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The decision to send

medical personnel and engineers to Pakistan, by contrast, took

longer as there was no precedent at the time for sending military

personnel to a non-NATO (or partner) country for a disaster relief

operation.

In the wake of both the Hurricane Katrina and Pakistan relief

operations, the alliance is now carrying out a lessons-learned exer-

cise. Once this has been completed and issues such as the

funding of certain elements of the operation are resolved, it might

be possible further to reduce response times. In this way, NATO

decision-making could be almost as quick as that of the national

authorities of an individual ally.

Funding reform

Looking ahead, one of the most important issues that needs to be

resolved before either NATO as a whole or individual allies again

make military capabilities available for disaster relief operations

is that of appropriate funding mechanisms. If, as at present, the

defence ministries of those countries that are asked to provide

helicopters for a future disaster relief operation are also expected

to carry the entire financial burden of their engagement, they may

decide that they cannot afford to become involved. Unless new

funding mechanisms are developed, intervention for disaster relief

would eat up a great portion of the defence budget. Meanwhile,

the first responders, both nationally and internationally, would

essentially be receiving help for free.

Some steps to reform and improve funding mechanisms were

already put in place during the Pakistan relief operation by indi-

vidual countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, the

Minister for International Development, Hilary Benn, decided to

cover the additional operating costs caused by the deployment

of three Chinook helicopters and a regiment of engineers out of

the international development budget. By using another budget

line, Benn was also able to make a significant financial contribu-

tion to the NATO ‘trust fund’ that met the costs of the air-bridge.

The benefits of Benn’s improvised arrangement are clear. In

this way, a department for international development does not

need to operate and deploy its own fleet of helicopters, thereby

avoiding duplication of assets. Moreover, depending on how costs

are calculated, this solution is likely to be considerably cheaper

than any arrangement involving the leasing of commercial heli-

copters if, indeed, they are available. Of course, there may be

other consequences of such an approach. A defence ministry

might, for example, decide to acquire more helicopters. But even

in this case, overheads, training and maintenance can be limited

to one organization instead of two or more.

In order to institutionalize such arrangements, however, it will

also be necessary to revise definitions of what constitutes official

development assistance (ODA). It seems that the financing of

military helicopters for disaster relief operations does not qualify

as official development assistance under current definitions. As

a result, there is a disincentive for development ministers to copy

the initiative of their UK counterpart in Pakistan. But given that

many countries are forging ever-stronger working relationships

between ministries of international development, defence and

foreign relations, it might be time to reassess the ODA criteria.

In the case of the Pakistan relief operation, such a move would

be especially appropriate since the UN asked NATO to provide

an air-bridge and to deploy helicopters. Logic demands that either

NATO nations be allowed to book some of the additional costs

incurred by their militaries to the international assistance and

development budgets or that the UN reimburse them directly out

of funds collected to pay for the relief operation. Since 1989,

many walls – both real and virtual – have been removed. It may

now be time to tear down some of the institutional divisions that

exist between the worlds of international assistance and devel-

opment on the one hand, and the military on the other.

Katrina relief operation

As the scale of the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in

the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi on 29

August 2005 became apparent, the EADRCC offered its services

to the US. That was on 2 September. A day later, an official US

request for assistance was received and forwarded within an hour

and a quarter to the capitals of all 46 members of the Euro-

Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). At Washington’s request,

an EADRCC liaison officer was deployed on 4 September to work

with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office

of Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington, DC.

The first two offers of assistance arrived on 4 September and,

in total, 39 EAPC members provided assistance through the

EADRCC. On 8 September, the North Atlantic Council autho-

rized a NATO transport operation consisting of NATO’s Airborne

Early Warning fleet training and cargo aircraft and NATO

Response Force (NRF) air and sealift to help move urgently

needed items from Europe to the US. The EADRCC acted as a

[

] 29

Loading relief aid for Hurricane Katrina victims

Photo: SHAPE